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Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: 
Windsor and “Bare Desire 
to Harm” 
Andrew Koppelman† 
Abstract 
In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court left many people 
unsatisfied when it failed to identify the level of scrutiny to apply to 
laws that classify by sexual orientation. That question, however, was 
not even presented. DOMA makes no reference to sexual orientation, 
but it does speak of “man” and “woman.” It classifies on the basis of 
sex. Sex-based classifications are presumptively unconstitutional. The 
Court avoided this rationale for its result, probably because it did not 
want to reach the question of whether states could deny same-sex 
couples the right to marry.  
The equal protection analysis upon which the Court did rely, the 
lesser-used “bare desire to harm” doctrine, had nothing to do with levels 
of scrutiny. It looked past that heuristic device to the underlying 
purposes of equal protection. This was a rare but appropriate response 
to an unusual kind of law, one that singles out a particular class and 
imposes an unprecedentedly broad disability upon it. 
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Introduction 
It is a truth universally acknowledged that the big question the 
Supreme Court evaded in United States v. Windsor,1 which invalidated 
section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act2 (DOMA), is this: what 
is the appropriate level of scrutiny for classifications based on sexual 
orientation?3 
But it is not true. That question was not even presented in 
Windsor. DOMA did not classify on the basis of sexual orientation. 
Lower courts were wrong to claim that it did. 
DOMA declared, in pertinent part, that the word “marriage,” 
wherever it appears in the United States Code, “means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.”4 It made 
no reference to sexual orientation, but it did speak of “man” and 
“woman.” It classified on the basis of sex. Sex-based classifications are 
presumptively unconstitutional. The Court avoided this rationale for 
its result, probably because it did not want to reach the question of 
whether states could deny same-sex couples the right to marry. The 
reasoning the Court did rely on, however, was correct and sufficient to 
dispose of the case before it. 
The equal protection analysis upon which the Court relied had 
nothing to do with levels of scrutiny.5 It looked past that heuristic 
device to the underlying purposes of equal protection.6 This was a rare 
but appropriate response to an unusual kind of law, one that singles 
out a particular class and imposes an unprecedentedly broad disability 
upon it. 
Part I of this Article explains why DOMA did not classify on the 
basis of sexual orientation. Part II explains that it did classify on the 
basis of sex. Part III examines the cases in which the Court invalidated 
a statute without expressly elevating the level of scrutiny. One such 
class of cases is that in which the statute targets a narrowly defined 
group and then imposes on it disabilities that are so broad and 
undifferentiated as to bear no discernible relationship to any legitimate 
 
1. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
2. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013). 
3. See, e.g., Mike Dorf, A Publicity Update and Then Three Thoughts on 
Justice Scalia’s Dissent in Windsor, Dorf on Law (June 28, 2013, 10:37 
AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/06/a-publicity-update-and-then-
three.html; Ariel Chesler, Some Justice for the Second Sexuality, 
Huffington Post (June 27, 2013, 1:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/ariel-chesler/some-justice-for-the-seco_b_3509168.html. 
4. 1 U.S.C. § 7. 
5. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–96. 
6.  Id. at 2693.  
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governmental interest. Part IV argues that DOMA was such a statute. 
Part V examines the curious place of federalism in the Windsor  
Court’s reasoning.  
I. It’s Not a Sexual Orientation Classification 
Many courts have now held that laws denying same-sex couples the 
right to marry classify on the basis of sexual orientation. Such laws, the 
courts say, therefore present the question of whether classification on 
the basis of sexual orientation is subject to heightened scrutiny.7 
DOMA, which withheld federal recognition from same-sex marriages 
for all purposes throughout the United States Code, similarly was held 
by lower courts to classify on the basis of sexual orientation.8 The 
Obama Administration reached the same conclusion,9 and that position 
was urged upon the Court in many of the briefs.10  
7. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan 
v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431 n.24 (Conn. 2008); In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 440–41 (Cal. 2008) (“[T]he marriage 
statutes, realistically viewed, operate clearly and directly to impose 
different treatment on gay individuals because of their sexual 
orientation.”), superseded by constitutional amendment, Cal. Const. 
art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013); see also Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866–
67 (8th Cir. 2006) (assuming that a challenge to a state marriage statute 
turns on whether homosexuality is a suspect classification). 
8. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181–85 (2d Cir. 2012) (assuming 
without argument that DOMA classifies on the basis of sexual 
orientation), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Pedersen v. 
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310–33 (D. Conn. 2012) 
(same); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 982 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (“DOMA makes distinctions between legally married 
couples, by granting benefits to opposite-sex married couples but denying 
benefits to same-sex married couples. Accordingly, DOMA treats gay and 
lesbian individuals differently on the basis of their sexual orientation.”). 
An exception is Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 
(D. Mass. 2010), which declined to address the level of scrutiny because 
the statute was invalid as lacking a rational basis. 
9. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Letter from the Attorney General to 
Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-
223.html (assuming without argument that DOMA classified on the basis 
of sexual orientation). 
10. See, e.g., Brief on the Merits for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 
15, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (Feb. 26, 2013) (No. 12-
307); Brief for the United States on the Merits Question at 18, United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (Feb. 22, 2013) (No. 12-307); Brief of 
172 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, Urging 
Affirmance on the Merits at 1, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(Mar. 1, 2013) (No. 12-307). 
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The objection that devastates this reasoning is simple. Respondent 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives 
(BLAG) argued in a footnote in its brief on the merits in Windsor that 
“DOMA does not classify based on a married couple’s sexual 
orientation” because a gay person could enter into a different-sex union 
that would fall within DOMA’s definition of marriage.11  
BLAG was right.12 To see why it was right, consider what it means 
for a law to classify on the basis of a trait. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states 
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”13 The Supreme Court has interpreted this 
provision as prohibiting arbitrary discrimination or treating similar 
things dissimilarly.14 Without more, this produces a very deferential 
standard of judicial review. “The general rule is that legislation is 
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn 
by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”15 Laws 
that classify based on “race, alienage, or national origin,” on the other 
hand, “are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they 
are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”16 Almost no 
legislation has been able to satisfy that test, whereas almost any 
legislation can meet “minimal scrutiny,” which asks whether the statute 
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. In the 1970s, the 
Court devised a third, intermediate level of scrutiny: classifications 
based on sex or illegitimacy are what has been infelicitously called 
“quasi-suspect”; they “will survive equal protection scrutiny to the 
extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest.”17 
This isn’t strict scrutiny, but it comes close. The Court has held that 
“the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the 
basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an exceedingly 
 
11. See Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory 
Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 25 n.7, United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (Jan. 22, 2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter BLAG 
Brief].  
12. It is right about the character of the classification. Whether there is 
impermissible discrimination is a different question. A law may be 
impermissibly discriminatory even if it does not facially classify on a suspect 
or quasi-suspect basis. See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
13  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
14. I am not endorsing this approach to equal protection. For my critique, 
see Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social 
Equality (1996). This Article stipulates existing doctrine and works 
within its parameters. 
15. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
16. Id. 
17. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982). 
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persuasive justification for the classification.”18 “The burden of 
justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State.”19  
Everything turns on whether the law employs a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification. How do we know when that is happening? A 
classification is based on trait T if it requires state officials, in 
allocating rights and burdens, to determine in specific cases whether T 
is present. Legal consequences must turn on the presence or absence of 
T. That is what it means to classify. 
The principle should be obvious. Evidently it is not. So here are 
some examples. 
In Brown v. Board of Education,20 the state had to determine the 
race of students in order to decide what school to place them in.21 That 
is how we know that the state was using a race-based classification. 
McLaughlin v. Florida22 unanimously invalidated a criminal statute 
prohibiting an unmarried interracial couple from habitually living in and 
occupying the same room at night.23 The Court found it “readily 
apparent” that the statute “treats the interracial couple made up of a 
white person and a Negro differently than it does any other couple.”24 
The race of the defendant was an essential element of the crime that the 
prosecution had to prove.25 Justice Stewart, concurring, declared that “it 
is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution 
which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of  
the actor.”26 
The principle works similarly with sex discrimination. Frontiero v. 
Richardson27 invalidated a law that automatically allowed male 
members of the Air Force to claim their wives as dependents and 
 
18. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 531 (1996) (“Parties who seek to defend gender-based government 
action must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification for that 
action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
19. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.  
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
21. Id. at 487–88.  
22. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
23. Id. at 184. 
24. Id. at 188. 
25. See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 538, 542 (1885) (“To be a negro 
is not a crime; to marry a white woman is not a crime; but to be a negro, 
and being a negro, to marry a white woman is a felony; therefore, it is 
essential to the crime that the accused shall be a negro—unless he is a 
negro he is guilty of no offence.”). 
26. 379 U.S. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
27. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).  
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therefore receive housing and medical benefits but required female 
members to prove that their husbands depended on them for more than 
half their support.28 If Sharron Frontiero had been male, she would have 
received the benefits.29 In order to determine her rights, the Air Force 
had to determine whether she was male or female. Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld30 struck down a provision of the Social Security Act that 
allowed a widowed mother, but not a widowed father, to receive 
survivor’s benefits based on the earnings of the deceased spouse.31 If 
Stephen Wiesenfeld had been female, he would have received the 
benefits he was denied.32 Once more, administrators had to determine 
whether he was male or female. The Court later referred to “the simple 
test of whether the evidence shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner 
which but for that person’s sex would be different.’”33 
The state is not classifying on the basis of T if it classifies on the 
basis of X, which overlaps very largely with T. Pregnancy-based 
classifications are not sex-based classifications, even though only 
women can become pregnant.34 In order to decide whether a person’s 
medical conditions arise from pregnancy, the state does not need to 
decide whether that person is male or female. The degree of overlap 
doesn’t matter. The test looks at the classification that appears within 
the statute, not at its external effects. 
Nor is the question but-for causation—whether a person would not 
be adversely affected by the statute if she did not belong to a protected 
class. Being female is a but-for cause of pregnancy. The question is 
whether the person administering the law is instructed by the law to 
classify on the basis of the characteristic and to allocate rights and 
duties on the basis of that classification. 
 
28. Id. at 680. 
29. See id. 
30.  420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
31. Id. at 653. 
32. Id. at 640–41. 
33. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) 
(quoting Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1170 (1971)) 
(holding that Title VII prohibits assessment of larger pension fund 
contributions from female than from male employees, even though as a 
class women do live longer than men). 
34. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974); see also Bray v. 
Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 505 U.S. 263, 271, 272 n.3 (1993) 
(citing Geduldig with approval). I am not here endorsing Geduldig’s 
holding that there is no sex discrimination. See Andrew Koppelman, 
The Gay Rights Question in Contemporary American Law 60 
(2002). However, it is correct that pregnancy discrimination does not 
require any state official to classify persons on the basis of sex. 
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So here is the problem. Neither a state law denying same-sex 
couples the right to marry nor DOMA require any official to determine 
anyone’s sexual orientation. Some laws do.35 Under the military’s now-
abandoned exclusion, officials had to decide whether someone was gay 
in order to decide whether they were to be thrown out.36 But the 
marriage laws don’t classify on that basis. 
The BLAG brief explained: 
A marriage between a man and a woman would fall within 
DOMA’s definition even if one or both spouses were homosexual. 
Similarly, the marriage of two men would fall outside the 
definition even if both were heterosexual. There is no question, 
however, that DOMA has a disproportionate impact on 
individuals with a homosexual orientation.37 
The concession in the last sentence of course conceded nothing 
important. Rather, it characterized the legal claim against DOMA as a 
clear loser. Disproportionate impact does not trigger heightened 
scrutiny. Even for African Americans, the group that receives the 
highest level of constitutional protection against discrimination, 
disparate impact, without more, does not state a constitutional claim.38 
In order to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, state action that does 
not employ a suspect classification must be taken “‘because of,’ not 
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”39 
 A facially neutral law may nonetheless violate equal protection if 
the disparate impact reflects a purpose to discriminate. This is not 
much help for the cause of same-sex marriage. The Iowa Supreme Court 
held that “[t]he benefit denied by the marriage statute—the status of 
civil marriage for same-sex couples—is so ‘closely correlated with being 
homosexual’ as to make it apparent the law is targeted at gay and 
lesbian people as a class.”40 But this is ahistorical fiction. Some facially 
 
35. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado 
state constitutional measure labeled “No Protected Status Based on 
Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation”).  
36. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2006) (“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” statute providing for 
discharge of a member of the United States armed forces for unconcealed 
homosexuality), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. 
37. BLAG Brief, supra note 11, at 25 n.7. 
38. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
39. Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
40. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment)). 
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neutral actions do intentionally target gay people,41 and thus 
discriminate even if they do not facially classify. But this cannot 
reasonably be said of the traditional definition of marriage, which 
antedates by millennia the modern conception of homosexuality.42  
As for the more recent legislative initiatives—statutory and state 
constitutional bans on same-sex marriage—these do not necessarily 
reflect a desire to harm gay people as such, or even a disrespectful 
devaluation of their interests.43 For many opponents of same-sex 
marriage, gay people are marginal to their view of the world. Justice 
Alito nicely summarized the position: “marriage is essentially the 
solemnizing of a comprehensive, exclusive, permanent union that is 
intrinsically ordered to producing new life, even if it does not always 
do so.”44 Whatever the merits of this notion,45 it is not about gay people. 
It is focused on the value of a certain kind of heterosexual union.46 The 
existence of gay people is a side issue.47 The function of marriage law, 
 
41. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, . . . [i]t 
is . . . directed toward gay persons as a class.”); Christian Legal Soc. 
Chapter v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010) (“Our decisions have 
declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context.”); see 
also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“When homosexual conduct is made 
criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an 
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
42. The Connecticut Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion by relying 
on the state’s civil union law, which placed same-sex couples in a separate 
category, rather than ignoring them altogether. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of 
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431 n.24 (Conn. 2008) (“It is readily apparent, 
therefore, that the statutory scheme at issue purposefully and 
intentionally distinguishes between same sex and opposite sex couples.”). 
But focusing on this produces the strange result that states offering some 
accommodation of gay couples violate equal protection, while states 
denying any recognition whatsoever do not. 
43. The contrary view is argued in Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, 
and the Future of Marriage Equality, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 
Sidebar 204 (2013), http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads
/2013/12/Pollvogt-113-Colum.-L.-Rev.-Sidebar-204.pdf.  
44. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 (2013) (Alito, J., 
dissenting).  
45. For a critique, see Andrew Koppelman, More Intuition than Argument, 
Commonweal, May 3, 2013, at 23 (reviewing Sherif Girgis et al., 
What is Marriage? Man and Woman: A Defense (2012)); Andrew 
Koppelman, Judging the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2014 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 431. 
46. See, e.g., Rod Dreher, Sex After Christianity, Am. Conservative, Mar.–
Apr. 2013, at 20. Thanks to Maggie Gallagher for calling this article to 
my attention. 
47. See Girgis et al., supra note 45, at 10–12, 86–93. 
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on this view, is to protect a human good that gay people happen to be 
unable to realize: marriage laws do not discriminate against them any 
more than art museums discriminate against blind people. The Court, 
Scalia wrote in Romer, should not be “verbally disparaging as bigotry 
adherence to traditional attitudes.”48 If the core of equal protection is 
the right to be treated as an equal, then it is not obvious that this right 
is violated by these laws.49 
II. But It Is a Sex-Based Classification 
In a footnote of its brief, BLAG stated that “DOMA classifies based 
on whether a marriage is . . . between two persons . . . of the opposite 
sex.”50 Here, BLAG was absolutely right. DOMA’s definition was a sex-
based classification. Such a classification was unconstitutional absent 
an “exceedingly persuasive justification.”51 Such justifications, in the 
context of discrimination against same-sex couples, evidently are hard 
to come by.52 
All discrimination against gay people is sex discrimination for the 
same reason that discrimination against members of interracial couples 
is race discrimination. The fact that a person is sexually attracted to 
women might trigger discrimination, depending on the target’s sex. So 
even the military exclusion, now repealed, turns out, on analysis, to be 
a kind of sex discrimination.53 But this analysis was unnecessary with 
DOMA, which used a sex-based classification on its face. 
 
48. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
49. DOMA, which lashed out wildly at gay people, presented a different 
case. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Scalia Should Have Voted to 
Overturn DOMA, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 131 (2013), http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/12/LRColl2013n12
Koppelman.pdf; Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the 
Defense of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1997). 
50. BLAG Brief, supra note 11, at 25 n.7. 
51  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
52. It is conceivable (though unlikely) that a court could decide that the 
goods associated with heterosexual marriage provide such a justification. 
See Girgis et al., supra note 45. That position would be far more 
coherent than the claim that a law targeting same-sex couples is not a 
sex-based classification. 
53. I have argued this for years. See Koppelman, supra note 14, at 146–76; 
Andrew Koppelman, Sexual Disorientation, 100 Geo. L.J. 1083 (2012); 
Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 Drake L. Rev. 
923, 945–49 (2010); Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy in 
Europe, or, Lisa Grant Meets Adolf Hitler, in Legal Recognition of 
Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of National, European and 
International Law 623 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs, eds., 
2001); Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument 
for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 
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Windsor presented exactly the same situation as Frontiero and 
Wiesenfeld. Had Edith Windsor been a man instead of a woman, the 
tax exclusion would automatically have been granted. The classification 
was sex-based because the state official had to determine what sex she 
was in order to decide how to treat her. 
Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy noticed this in the oral argument 
in Hollingsworth v. Perry,54 the California same-sex marriage case that 
was dismissed for lack of standing on the day that Windsor was 
decided.55 In Windsor itself, Justice Alito wrote in his dissenting opinion 
 
519 (2001); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians 
and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1994) 
[hereinafter Koppelman, Why Discrimination]; Andrew Koppelman, Note, 
The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 Yale 
L.J. 145 (1988) [hereinafter Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation 
Analogy]. 
54. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
55. Here is the transcript: 
[MR. COOPER:] The issues, the constitutional issues that have 
been presented to the Court, are not of first impression here. In 
Baker v. Nelson, this Court unanimously dismissed for want of a 
substantial Federal question. 
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Cooper, Baker v. Nelson was 1971. 
The Supreme Court hadn’t even decided that gender-based 
classifications get any kind of heightened scrutiny. 
MR. COOPER: That is— 
JUSTICE GINSBURG: And the same-sex intimate conduct was 
considered criminal in many States in 1971, so I don’t think we 
can extract much in Baker v. Nelson. 
MR. COOPER: Well, Your Honor, certainly I acknowledge the 
precedential limitations of a summary dismissal. But Baker v. 
Nelson also came fairly fast on the heels of the Loving decision. 
And, Your Honor, I simply make the observation that it seems 
implausible in the extreme, frankly, for nine justices to have—to 
have seen no substantial Federal question if it is true, as the 
Respondents maintain, that the traditional definition of marriage 
insofar as—insofar as it does not include same-sex couples, insofar 
as it is a gender definition is irrational and can only be explained, 
can only be explained, as a result of anti-gay malice and a bare 
desire to harm. 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do you believe this can be treated as a 
gender-based classification? 
MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I— 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: It’s a difficult question that I’ve been 
trying to wrestle with it. 
MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor. And we do not. We do not 
think it is properly viewed as a gender-based classification. 
Virtually every appellate court, State and Federal, with one 
exception, Hawaii, in a superseded opinion, has agreed that it is 
not a gender-based classification, but I guess it is gender-based in 
the sense that marriage itself is a gendered institution, a gendered 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Beyond Levels of Scrutiny 
1055 
that Windsor sought “a holding that enshrines in the Constitution a 
particular understanding of marriage under which the sex of the 
partners makes no difference.”56 
A few judges have accepted the sex discrimination argument for 
same-sex marriage,57 but many more have rejected it. The argument 
that is always made is that there is no sex-based classification because 
persons of both sexes are equally forbidden to marry a person of the 
same sex.58 Sex discrimination challenges to DOMA were rejected on 
 
term, and so in the same way that fatherhood is gendered more 
motherhood is gendered, it’s gendered in that sense. 
But we—we agree that to the extent that the classification 
impacts, as it clearly does, same-sex couples, that—that 
classification can be viewed as being one of sexual orientation 
rather than – 
 
 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–14, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652 (Mar. 26, 2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 1212745 at *12–15. Note 
how, at the end of the exchange, Cooper tries to argue that a law that 
has a disparate impact on same-sex couples is a sexual orientation 
classification. That is an obvious misstatement of equal protection law. 
See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. On the possible attractions 
of the sex discrimination argument for Justice Kennedy, see Sonja West, 
What is Anthony Kennedy Thinking?, Slate (June 12, 
2013, 10:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2013/06/anthony_kennedy_s_gay_marriage_views_the
_supreme_court_justice_may_see_banning.single.html. 
56. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
57. E.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1206 (D. Utah 2013) 
(dictum); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 
2010); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 29–30 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., 
dissenting); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 971–73 
(Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J., concurring); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 
905–07 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, 
at *5 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64–
67 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 
963, 1037–39 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (Bridge, J., concurring in dissent). 
See also Terveer v. Billington, 2014 WL 1280301 at *9 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(holding that discrimination against gay employee is based on 
nonconformity with sex stereotypes). 
58. E.g., Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 2014 WL 2054264 at *7 (D. Or. 2014) (“Men 
and women are prohibited from doing the exact same thing: marrying an 
individual of the same gender.”); Latta v. Otter, 2014 WL 1909999 at *15 
(D. Idaho 2014) (“[T]wo men have no more right to marry under Idaho 
law than two women. In other words, Idaho’s Marriage Laws are facially 
gender neutral and there is no evidence that they were motivated by a 
gender discriminatory purpose.”); Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 
996, 1005 (D. Nev. 2012) (“The laws at issue here are not directed toward 
persons of any particular gender . . . .”); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. 
Supp. 2d 1065, 1098 (D. Haw. 2012) (the marriage prohibition “is gender-
neutral on its face; it prohibits men and women equally from marrying a 
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the same basis.59 The argument is inconsistent with binding Supreme 
Court precedent, which rejected a structurally identical argument in 
the context of race,60 but set that aside. Imagine a different, equally 
symmetrical statute, forbidding persons of both sexes to perform a job 
“traditionally performed by the other sex.”61 Or here’s another: “a 
statute that required courts to give custody of male children to fathers 
 
member of the same-sex”); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10–11 (“[w]omen 
and men are treated alike—they are permitted to marry people of the 
opposite sex, but not people of their own sex”); In re Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d 384, 436 (Cal. 2008) (“[T]he challenged marriage statutes do not 
treat men and women differently.”), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 597–98 
(Md. 2007) (finding that the state ERA is not implicated unless a statute 
grants “rights to men or women as a class, to the exclusion of an entire 
subsection of similarly situated members of the opposite sex”); Andersen, 
138 P.3d at 988 (“Men and women are treated identically” when same-
sex marriage is prohibited); In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 
706–09 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the opposite-sex marriage 
requirement is a law that “merely mentions gender,” treats both sexes 
equally, and so is not discriminatory), rev’d, 183 P.3d 384, 436 (Cal. 
2008); Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13 (“[E]ach sex is equally prohibited from 
precisely the same conduct.”); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 
307, 363 n.2 (D.C. App. 1995) (Steadman, J., concurring) (“The marriage 
statute applies equally to men and women.”); Phillips v. Wisconsin Pers. 
Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 127–28 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that 
woman with female partner was not discriminated against because men 
with male partners were similarly denied benefits); Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71 
(Heen, J., dissenting) (“[A]ll males and females are treated alike.”); see 
also Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971) (citing a “clear 
distinction” without explaining what it is), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 
(1972); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191–92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) 
(indicating that the discrimination is based not on sex but on the 
definition of marriage). The Latta v. Otter court also deemed it significant 
that “the Supreme Court has not equated sexual orientation 
discrimination and sex discrimination despite several opportunities to do 
so,” 2014 WL 2054264 at *15. However, it is familiar doctrine that a Court 
does not reject an argument on the merits when it simply finds it 
unnecessary to address it. 
59. See, e.g., Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 877 (C.D. Cal. 
2005), aff’d in part, vacated in part and remanded with directions to 
dismiss for lack of standing, 447 F.3d 673, 686 (9th Cir. 2006); Wilson v. 
Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307–08 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“DOMA does not 
discriminate on the basis of sex because it treats women and men 
equally.”); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) 
(“Women, as members of one class, are not being treated differently from 
men, as members of a different class.”). 
60. Even a law student could figure this out. See Koppelman, Note, The 
Miscegenation Analogy, supra note 53, at 147. 
61. Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation 
Analogy, 34 Rutgers L.J. 107, 143 (2002).  
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and female children to mothers.”62 By the argument’s logic, these laws 
do not impose sex-based classifications. Stephen Clark has observed: 
The semantic trick is simply to avoid talking about the sex-based 
differential in concrete terms of what opportunities women and 
men are allowed and, instead, to embed that very differential in 
the supposed single standard, which is recast as a uniformly 
applicable formula that allocates opportunities to “everyone” by 
making everyone’s opportunities turn, in the but-for sense, on 
what their sex happens to be.63 
Another strategy for rejecting the sex discrimination argument is 
importing into the equal protection analysis elements that do not 
belong there—either a rule that “separate but equal” does not violate 
equal protection,64 or a rule that sex classifications are permissible 
unless the challenger shows that they were adopted with the purpose 
of subordinating women.65 Neither of these has ever been adopted by 
the Supreme Court, and both are inconsistent with well-settled 
precedents. To make matters worse, the courts rejecting the sex 
discrimination arguments have often relied on sex-based stereotypes to 
justify the denial of marriage to same-sex couples: that men and women 
provide distinct role models for children, that the two sexes have 
complementary roles in marriage, that marriage is a remedy for male  
62. Baker, 744 A.2d at 906 n.10 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
63. Clark, supra note 61, at 144. 
64. Clark shows that this is a rule that has implicitly been accepted in some 
sex discrimination cases, but only where the burden is a trivial one, such 
as a requirement that men and women use separate toilets. It will not 
work here unless it can be shown that the partner you want is fungible 
with the partner that the state wants you to have. Id. at 174–84. What 
the California Supreme Court said about race is equally applicable here: 
“A member of any of these races may find himself barred by law from 
marrying the person of his choice and that person to him may be 
irreplaceable. Human beings are bereft of worth and dignity by a doctrine 
that would make them as interchangeable as trains.” Perez v. Lippold, 
198 P.2d 17, 25 (Cal. 1948). 
65. Clark, supra note 61, at 147–53. Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. 
Supp. 2d 1252, 1286 (N.D. Okla. 2014); Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 
2d 939, 961 (2013). Justice Scalia so argues in his response to the sex 
discrimination argument in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599–600 
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia is right that a discriminatory 
purpose is sufficient to subject “a facially neutral law that makes no 
mention of race” to strict scrutiny. Id. at 600. But this does not 
distinguish the miscegenation laws, which were not facially neutral. If 
challengers had this burden, they would be able to satisfy it, because the 
homosexuality taboo is, as a matter of cultural fact, closely tied to the 
subordination of women. See Koppelman, Why Discrimination, supra 
note 53, at 234–73. 
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irresponsibility.66 So, far from justifying laws under intermediate 
scrutiny, these are the very illicit motives that intermediate scrutiny is 
trying to detect. 
Courts have gone to great lengths to resist the sex discrimination 
argument, which they have regarded as “counterintuitive and 
legalistic.”67 The resistance is puzzling. Any law that discriminates 
against gay people classifies on the basis of sex, and until recently 
sodomy laws criminalized some conduct for one sex but not for the 
other.68 It is hard to understand how this aggressive policing of the 
boundaries of gender could be imagined to have nothing to do with  
sex discrimination. 
The Court could have disposed of Windsor on sex discrimination 
grounds. Why didn’t it do that? This would have been doctrinally tidy 
and would not have required the Court to craft any new law. On the 
other hand, it would have reached the question that the Court avoided 
in Perry, effectively declaring the presumptive invalidity of every law 
in the country denying same-sex couples the right to marry. The Court 
was not eager to reach that issue.69 
III. Beyond Levels of Scrutiny 
Instead, the Court relied on a line of cases that hold that a law is 
invalid if it reflects a “bare desire to harm” a politically unpopular 
group. None of these cases say what level of scrutiny is being applied. 
It seems to be minimal, rational basis scrutiny, yet it is rational basis 
“with bite.” These cases puzzle scholars.70  
 
66. This is extensively documented in Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex 
Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 Harv. J.L. 
& Gender 461 (2007). 
67. Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1008 (W.D. Wisc. 2014). 
68. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
69. See Andrew Koppelman, Salvaging Perry, 125 Harv. L. Rev. F. 69 
(2012). This was emphasized in an amicus brief that I coauthored. See 
Brief of Amici Curiae William N. Eskridge Jr., Rebecca L. Brown, Daniel 
A. Farber, and Andrew Koppelman in Support of Respondents, 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (Feb. 28, 2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 
WL 840011 (advocating for an application of equal protection similar to 
the Ninth Circuit’s equal protection analysis). 
70. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and 
Policies 704–06 (4th ed. 2011) (attempting to reconcile cases scrutinized 
under rational basis “with bite” with cases decided according to 
traditional rational basis scrutiny); Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational 
Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer 
v. Evans, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 357, 357–58 (1999) (noting that the cases that 
have been scrutinized under rational basis “with bite” do not seem to 
exhibit an obvious pattern). 
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Is it appropriate thus to discard the scheme of levels of scrutiny? It 
depends on the reasons for using that judge-made device in the  
first place. 
The Court has repeatedly explained: 
the purpose of strict scrutiny is to “smoke out” illegitimate uses 
of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal 
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The 
test also ensures that the means chosen “fit” this compelling goal 
so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for 
the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.71 
The bare desire to harm cases, which I examine in this Part, bypass 
that heuristic in a few rare cases where the device is unnecessary for 
inferring such a purpose. In those cases, the Court adopted a different 
heuristic. 
Illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotypes are illegitimate because 
they devalue the interests of some citizens, treating them as less than 
full members of the community. Paul Brest observes that one way in 
which equal protection can be violated is for state actions to reflect 
“racially selective sympathy and indifference,” meaning “the 
unconscious failure to extend to a minority the same recognition of 
humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care, given as a matter 
of course to one’s own group.”72 John Hart Ely argues that in order for 
legislation to be legitimate, the citizens must all “be represented in the 
sense that their interests are not to be left out of account or valued 
negatively in the lawmaking process.”73 Racial prejudice is one driver 
of that devaluation. But it is hardly the only one. That is why the 
Equal Protection Clause does not only forbid racial discrimination. 
 
71. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); see also Johnson 
v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 (2005) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (same); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (same). 
72. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of 
the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (1976). 
73. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial 
Review 223 n.33 (1980). Legislation on the basis of stereotyping violates 
this constraint by massively overgeneralizing: “[T]o disadvantage—in the 
perceived service of some overriding social goal—a thousand persons that a 
more individualized (but more costly) test or procedure would exclude, 
under the impression that only five hundred fit that description, is to deny 
the five hundred to whose existence you are oblivious their right to equal 
concern and respect, by valuing their welfare at zero.” Id. at 157. The theory 
of equal respect in decision making that these authors rely upon is 
elaborated and defended in Koppelman, supra note 14, at 13–56, and 
Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 Wm. & Mary 
Bill Rts. J. 89, 101–03 (1997) [hereinafter Koppelman, Invidious Intent]. 
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Certain legislative classifications are so closely associated with 
prejudice that courts presume an illegitimate purpose. But there are 
other ways to infer such a purpose. One is to consider whether the law’s 
“purported justifications” make “no sense in light of how the 
[government has] treated other groups similarly situated in relevant 
respects.”74 If that is the case, the Court can reasonably infer that the 
basis of the law is “irrational prejudice.”75 The bare desire to harm cases 
show another path to the same conclusion. 
The first of these is USDA v. Moreno.76 The Court invalidated a 
1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 196477 that excluded from 
participation in the food stamp program any member of a household 
whose members are not all related to each other.78 Congress, the 
legislative history showed, was attempting to prevent “hippie 
communes” from receiving any stamps.79 The Court—after finding that 
the law did not fit any of the purposes cited in its defense—held that 
this purpose (which the government did not argue for) could not 
provide the needed rational basis: “[I]f the constitutional concept of 
‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least 
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”80 The law 
in Moreno had no purpose other than to keep federal benefits out of 
the hands of a group Congress did not like. The Court, however, did 
not decide that this was the purpose of the law. Rather, if this 
impermissible purpose was excluded, the law had no purpose at all. 
Moreno became relevant to the gay rights question in Romer v. 
Evans,81 which struck down an amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution—referred to on the ballot as Amendment 2—declaring 
that neither the state nor any of its subdivisions could prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual 
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.”82 The Amendment, 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court observed, “has the peculiar 
property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single  
74. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 n.4 (2001). 
75. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. 
76. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).  
77. Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–
2033 (2012)).  
78. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529. 
79. Id. at 534. 
80. Id. This language is quoted in part in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
81. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
82. Id. at 624 (quoting Colo. Const. art. II, § 30b, invalidated by Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). 
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named group.”83 The Amendment seemed to “deprive[ ] gays and 
lesbians even of the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit 
arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings.”84 The 
Court concluded that “Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to 
further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone 
else.”85 Quoting Moreno, it found that the broad disability imposed on 
a targeted group  
raise[d] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is 
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected. “[I]f the 
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means 
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.”86  
Romer’s holding may thus be summarized:  
[I]f a law targets a narrowly defined group and then imposes upon 
it disabilities that are so broad and undifferentiated as to bear no 
discernible relationship to any legitimate governmental interest, 
then the Court will infer that the law’s purpose is simply to harm 
that group, and so will invalidate the law.87 
It remains to consider whether the Court properly applied this rule  
to DOMA.  
IV. DOMA, Bare Desire to Harm,  
and Reckless Indifference 
DOMA cut off federal benefits to a targeted, politically unpopular 
group, just like the law in Moreno, and it did so in a remarkably broad 
and undifferentiated way, just like the law in Romer.  
DOMA’s definitional provision and the amendment invalidated in 
Romer have telling similarities. Like the Colorado amendment, this 
provision “identifie[d] persons by a single trait [membership in a same-
sex marriage] and then denies them protection across the board.”88 For 
the first time in American history, DOMA created a set of second-class 
marriages, valid under state law but void for all federal purposes. The  
83. Id. at 632. 
84. Id. at 630. 
85. Id. at 635. 
86. Id. at 634 (quoting USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
87. Koppelman, supra note 34, at 8; Koppelman, Invidious Intent, supra note 73, 
at 94. The Court is also evidently influenced by its knowledge of a group’s 
political unpopularity, but many of these decisions do not mention that. 
88. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
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exclusion of a class of valid state marriages from all federal recognition 
is “unprecedented in our jurisprudence.”89  
What could justify this broad disability?  
Justice Scalia offered this: “DOMA avoids difficult choice-of-law 
issues that will now arise absent a uniform federal definition of 
marriage.”90 What happens, he asked, to the marriage of a couple who 
wed in New York and move to Alabama? “DOMA avoided all of this 
uncertainty by specifying which marriages would be recognized for 
federal purposes.”91 Chief Justice Roberts likewise cited “[i]nterests in 
uniformity and stability.”92 
But federal laws and regulations already dealt with those questions, 
which will still arise with underage marriages, cousin marriages, 
common-law marriages, and the like.93 Federal agencies have routinely 
addressed these situations for more than a century.94 Justice Scalia did 
not explain why same-sex marriage is any different.  
More important is the question of the proportionality of the 
response. These conflict of laws problems are rare. That is why, for a 
long time, almost no one has noticed that federal law is often unclear 
about what state’s law to apply to determine marriage for federal 
 
89. Id. 
90. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2708 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also claims that 
“DOMA’s definitional section was enacted to ensure that state-level 
experimentation did not automatically alter the basic operation of federal 
law.” Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is circular: that law’s 
operation changes in just the same way—incorporating new couples into 
the existing structure—whenever a marriage takes place, regardless of the 
gender of the spouses. 
93. For example, the Social Security Act states, “An applicant is the wife, 
husband, widow, or widower . . . if the courts of the State in which such 
insured individual is domiciled . . . would find that such applicant and such 
insured individual were validly married . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) 
(2006). The Veterans’ Benefits Act directs that “[i]n determining whether or 
not a person is or was the spouse of a veteran, their marriage shall be proven 
as valid . . . according to the law of the place where the parties resided at the 
time of the marriage or the law of the place where the parties resided when 
the right to benefits accrued.” 38 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006). The Family and 
Medical Leave Act operates similarly. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.122(b) (2013) 
(defining spouse under the Family and Medical Leave Act as “a husband or 
wife as defined or recognized under State law for purposes of marriage in the 
State where the employee resides, including common law marriage in States 
where it is recognized”). 
94. See Brief of Dr. Donna E. Shalala et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 13–29, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(Mar. 1, 2013) (No. 12-307) (collecting cases). 
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purposes.95 In a country with thousands of same-sex marriages, 
remarkably few such cases have actually arisen.96  
DOMA’s blunderbuss response was to withhold recognition from all 
of these marriages, even that overwhelming majority of marriages in 
which the couple never changes their home, and in which no conflict of 
laws problem arises. 
Same-sex spouses could not file joint tax returns.97 Pre-tax dollars 
could not be used to pay for health insurance or health care expenses 
for a same-sex spouse or that spouse’s dependent children.98 A same-
sex spouse’s debts incurred under divorce decrees or separation 
agreements were dischargeable in bankruptcy, unlike similar debts 
owed to an opposite-sex spouse.99 Same-sex spouses of federal employees 
were excluded from the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program,100 
the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance program,101 and the 
Federal Employees Compensation Act, which compensates the widow 
or widower of an employee killed in the performance of duty.102 Same-
sex spouses were the only surviving widows and widowers who would 
not have automatic ownership rights in a copyrighted work after the 
author’s death.103 Same-sex spouses were denied preferential treatment 
under immigration law and, therefore, were the only legally married 
spouses of American citizens who faced deportation.104 It is a federal 
 
95. William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 
64 Stan. L. Rev. 1371 (2012), which Justice Scalia cites in Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting), is an impressive work of scholarship, but 
revealingly, the issue it raises had been neglected for decades. See Baude, 
supra, at 1373–74. Unlike Justice Scalia, Baude does not suggest that these 
problems justify DOMA. 
96. I’ve been on the lookout for them since I wrote Same Sex, Different States: 
When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines (2006). Because same-sex 
couples’ strongest claims will be based on unfair surprise, this is not a 
kind of test case that can be planned. Andrew Koppelman, The Limits of 
Strategic Litigation, 17 L. & Sexuality 1, 2 (2008). 
97. See 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (2012). 
98. See id. § 105(b). 
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2012). 
100. See 5 U.S.C. § 8901(5) (2012).  
101. See id. § 8701(d)(1)(A). 
102. See id. § 8101(6), (11). 
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(C)(ii) (2012). 
104. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Bill Proposes Immigration Rights for Gay 
Couples, N.Y. Times, June 3, 2009, at A19 (explaining proposed 
legislation to give same-sex partners of American citizens and legal 
immigrants residency in the United States); Editorial, Reunite This 
Family, Bos. Globe, Aug. 27, 2007, at A8 (observing that a Brazilian 
citizen was forced to seek asylum because his same-sex marriage to an 
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crime to assault, kidnap, or kill a member of the immediate family of a 
federal official in order to influence or retaliate against that official—
but it was not if you did that to a same-sex spouse.105 With the end of 
the exclusion of gay people from the military,106 DOMA made it official 
policy to withhold any survivor’s benefits from the surviving spouse of 
a soldier killed in the line of duty.107 And so on.  
Once every few years, DOMA might have simplified some federal 
bureaucrat’s job. Everyone else was saddled with enormous burdens.108 
Thousands of employers in states that recognize same-sex marriage 
were required to maintain two separate administrative regimes for 
benefits—one handling federal benefits affected by DOMA, and another 
to comply with state law. Mapping the border between those two 
regimes was so complex that the task has begotten a small industry of 
compliance specialists—expensive professionals whose work is a 
deadweight loss for the American economy. A group of 278 employers 
and organizations, in an amicus brief to the Court, explained: 
Some amici have had to pay vendors to reprogram benefits and 
payroll systems, to add coding to reconcile different tax and 
benefit treatments, to reconfigure at every benefit and coverage 
level, and to revisit all of these modifications with every change 
in tax or ERISA laws for potential DOMA impact. . . . Benefits 
and human resources departments, facing questions from 
employees with same-sex spouses regarding workplace benefit 
selections and coverage, must be adequately trained and prepared 
to explain the disparate treatment to employees who may later 
realize (perhaps too late) that their benefits choices and decisions 
carried unanticipated and significant financial implications.109 
Even large employers were overwhelmed. Yale University had to tell its 
employees that, because of a programming error, it had failed to 
withhold taxes for the imputed value of health coverage for same-sex 
 
American citizen was not recognized by the United States government 
when it came to immigration). 
105. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013) (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(A) (2006)). 
106. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-321, 124 Stat. 
3515.  
107. See 10 U.S.C. § 1447(9) (2012). 
108. Burdens on third parties, other than those facially targeted by a statute, 
are not normally a part of equal protection analysis. They are, however, 
relevant to an assessment of a law’s rationality. Thanks to Bob Bennett 
for helpful conversation on this issue. 
109. Brief of 278 Employers and Organizations Representing Employers as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 28, 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (Feb. 27, 2013) (No. 12-307). 
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spouses in 2010, resulting in extra deductions in 2011.110 Because state 
antidiscrimination laws protect many gay employees, the employer had 
to determine, at its own risk, where DOMA did and did not supersede 
state law.  
DOMA did not even “eas[e] administrative burdens”111 for 
government actors. For example, it created fiendishly complex problems 
for bankruptcy courts, which must deal with property rights created by 
marriages recognized under state law (which, of course, DOMA could 
not annul without running afoul of the Takings Clause) while somehow 
withholding recognition for federal purposes.112 
DOMA deemed the interest in nonrecognition of same-sex couples 
to be so overridingly urgent as to justify sacrificing a huge range of 
other government interests, some of the highest order. Bankruptcy 
courts could not accomplish efficient and predictable adjudication. 
Government employees could not insure their dependents. The Social 
Security survivor benefits program, “‘the primary purpose [of which] is 
to pay benefits in accordance with the probable needs of the 
beneficiaries,’”113 could not accomplish this goal. Retirees could not 
provide for the security of their dependent spouses. Income taxation 
could not account for family obligations. National safety itself was 
compromised because the military could not provide its members’ 
families with healthcare, housing, and survivorship benefits that are 
essential to military effectiveness.114 
Other conflict of law solutions were available. The most obvious 
ones are those based on the place of celebration or the domicile of the 
couple (which, for many couples, are the same state, so the choice 
between these rules makes no difference).115 Blanket nonrecognition is 
such an extraordinary overreaction that even the Jim Crow South did 
not adopt it with respect to interracial marriage.116  
 
110. Tara Siegel Bernard, Yale Payroll Error Gives Gay Employees a 
New Year Surprise, N.Y. Times Bucks Blog (Jan. 11, 2011, 1:45 PM), 
http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/yale-payroll-error-costs-gay
-employees-thousands/. 
111. BLAG Brief, supra note 11, at 34. 
112. See Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and 
Same-Sex Marriage, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 881, 883 (2006).  
113. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 644 (1975) (quoting H.R. Rep. 
No. 728, at 7 (1939)). 
114. See Brief of Hon. Lawrence J. Korb et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent Windsor on the Merits Question at 3, United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (Mar. 1, 2013) (No. 12-307). 
115. Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-
Sex Marriages Cross State Lines 82–96 (2006). 
116. See id. at 28–50. 
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Note what DOMA did not do. Justice Kennedy claimed that 
Congress’s purpose was “to influence or interfere with state sovereign 
choices.”117 Justice Alito sensibly responded that DOMA “does not 
prevent any State from recognizing same-sex marriage or from 
extending to same-sex couples any right, privilege, benefit, or obligation 
stemming from state law.”118 There is no evidence that DOMA 
influenced any state’s decision whether to adopt same-sex marriage, 
and it is hard to imagine how it could have.119 
But Congress’s helplessness cut against the law’s reasonableness. 
DOMA was often defended as manifesting moral opposition to same-
sex marriage—which, we have stipulated, is a constitutionally 
permissible purpose. But that purpose cannot justify a statute that does 
not promote that end in any significant way. The question before 
Congress was not whether same-sex marriages would exist. It was 
undisputed that Congress had no power to answer that question, which 
is reserved to the states.120 The real issue was whether to have a set of 
second-class marriages, denied recognition for all federal purposes, even 
in contexts in which the whole purpose of the federal classification is 
defeated by not recognizing the marriage. 
A law will fail even rational basis review if the “purported 
justifications” make “no sense in light of how the [government has] treated 
other groups similarly situated in relevant respects.”121 DOMA does, 
however, very effectively “tell[ ] [same-sex] couples, and all the world, that 
their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition.”122  
117. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
118. Id. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
119. It is unclear from the legislative history whether Congress intended to 
influence states’ deliberations on whether to recognize same-sex 
marriages. The House Judiciary Committee report says repeatedly that 
each state will remain free to decide this policy issue for itself. See, e.g., 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664 at 3, 17, 24 (1996). The report also indicates, 
however, that the legislation will provide “assistance” to those states that 
have no declared public policy against recognition of same-sex marriage. 
See id. at 10 n.33. 
120. That is one reason why Paul Clement’s argument, on behalf of the House 
Republicans—nonrecognition is rational because it somehow makes 
heterosexual couples more likely to marry when unexpected pregnancy 
occurs—makes so little sense that it was ignored even by Scalia and Alito. 
See BLAG Brief, supra note 11, at 47–48. Even if this convoluted causal 
chain is accepted, DOMA doesn’t prevent any same-sex marriages from 
occurring. For the same reason, even if one accepts Justice Alito’s view 
that there is a legitimate moral view that objects to same-sex marriage as 
such, that premise can’t justify DOMA. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 
(Alito, J., dissenting). 
121. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 n.4 (2001) (per 
Rehnquist, C.J.; Scalia, J., in majority). 
122. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
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The relevant legislative purpose here is not precisely desire to harm. 
It is more like what the Model Penal Code has in mind when it refers 
to homicide “committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of human life.”123 In such cases, death 
is caused by “the intentional doing of an uncalled-for act in callous 
disregard of its likely harmful effects on others.”124 One element in 
determining extreme indifference is the social utility of the conduct: 
speeding through crowded streets for the thrill of it is a paradigmatic 
case, but doing that to carry a passenger who needs emergency surgery 
to the hospital may not be a crime at all.125 
Given current doctrine, can extreme indifference constitute an 
equal protection violation? The answer is that it can when a group is 
singled out for unprecedentedly harsh treatment. It is true that, as we 
already noted, disparate impact does not violate equal protection unless 
the challenged action was taken “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ 
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”126 Doesn’t that mean 
that extreme indifference raises no constitutional difficulty? 
But the disparate impact cases need to be put in perspective. From 
the standpoint of equal protection theory, a standard that tolerates 
extreme indifference makes no sense for the reasons we just considered.127 
The better explanation for this doctrine is that full judicial enforcement 
of equal protection is institutionally impossible. The Court was unwilling 
to hold that disparate impact, without more, creates a presumption of 
unconstitutionality because such a rule “would raise serious questions 
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public 
service, regulatory, and licensing statutes . . . .”128 This argument is not 
about the scope of equal protection but rather the consequences of 
judicial intervention. Some constitutional provisions, notably the Equal 
Protection Clause, are judicially underenforced because of the Court’s 
concern about institutional limitations of this kind.129 
 
123. Model Penal Code § 210.2(1)(b) (1980). 
124. Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 449 (Pa. 1946), quoted in 
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries 
23 (1980). 
125. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 14.4(a), at 439 
(2d ed. 2003). 
126. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
127. The defects of the Feeney standard are explained in David A. Strauss, 
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
935, 962–64 (1989). 
128. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). 
129. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1214–20 (1978). The same 
concern about the Court’s institutional limitations dominate Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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What the Court needs is a rule for detecting illicit purpose that 
respects those limitations. Strict scrutiny is one such rule. The bare 
desire to harm cases, which I examinee in detail in Part III, bypass that 
heuristic in unusual cases where the device is unnecessary for inferring 
such a purpose. In those cases, the Court adopted a different heuristic: 
the fact that a group is singled out for an unprecedentedly harsh 
treatment. When that happens, the Court will presume that what is 
going on is a bare desire to harm, rather than mere moral disapproval.130 
That rule evidently was relied upon, sub silentio, in Windsor. 
Moreno and Romer invalidated laws for lacking a rational basis, 
but any statute’s terms suggest a purpose that the statute rationally 
serves.131 A law that bans the driving of blue Volkswagens on Tuesdays 
is rationally—indeed, perfectly—related to the purpose of preventing 
blue Volkswagens from being driven on Tuesdays. The real issue is 
whether some goals are impermissible or too costly to be worth 
pursuing, a question that cannot be answered on the basis of 
“rationality.”132 David Hume famously wrote: “‘Tis not contrary to 
reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of 
my finger.”133 But that’s not the sense of rationality that the Court 
relied on, or should rely on.  
Windsor clarifies what can count as a bare desire to harm. A 
demand that harm be the ultimate goal of the state’s action would be 
preposterously difficult to satisfy. Windsor indicates that the 
Constitution is violated when a group is deliberately singled out for 
broad harm for the sake of an insignificant benefit. Singled out: this is 
not a matter of unintended impact.134 In that context, extreme 
indifference is a constitutional harm that has a remedy. There is no 
duty to aid a starving infant, but neither may one hurl it through the 
window in order to get into one’s house. 
 
130. That principle evidently also influenced the outcome in Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), in which the Court invalidated a criminal 
prohibition of homosexual sex. See Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence’s 
Penumbra, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1171, 1179 (2004). 
131. See Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law: 
Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1049, 1056–
57 (1979); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of 
the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 345–47 (1949); Robert F. Nagel, Note, 
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 Yale L.J. 123, 
124 (1972). 
132. Bennett, supra note 13131, at 1078. 
133. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 416 (L.A. Selby-Bigge 
ed., 1888) (1739–40). 
134. The difference here is analogous to the Takings Clause rule that while 
state action merely diminishing the value of one’s land is not a taking—
adverse impact is not enough—any state occupation of even a tiny portion 
of that land must be compensated. 
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Recall that a finding of extreme indifference for murder depends on 
an assessment of the utility of the defendant’s conduct.135 The exact same 
behavior will or will not be criminally negligent depending on the value 
of its object. To trigger liability, it is not necessary that the conduct have 
no value whatsoever. It really can be thrilling to speed down a crowded 
street, and pleasure is not valueless. But anyone who thinks that the 
pleasure is worth it—who endangers others “for his diversion merely”136—
manifests a “depraved mind, regardless of human life.”137 
Windsor’s conclusion that DOMA was irrational implicitly relied 
on a similar proportionality analysis. That analysis is only a minor 
theme in strict scrutiny, though it has some role: the interest in question 
has to be a truly compelling one. The analysis balances cost and 
benefit.138 Stephen Siegel has shown that cost justification was the 
original point of strict scrutiny, which was later transformed into a 
device for discerning illicit motive.139 That shift was led by John Hart 
Ely, who thought it inappropriate for judges to second-guess 
legislatures’ policy decisions.140 Ely’s caution about judicial 
policymaking is sensible, and the modern Court evidently shares it.141 
But deference is not necessarily unlimited. If the benefit is trivial by 
comparison with the cost, then it is appropriate to infer that the 
decision has an improper purpose.142 
DOMA’s purpose was to convey a message of disdain for gay 
couples, with extreme indifference to the human costs. As with the 
 
135. See supra notes 123–23 and accompanying text.  
136. Brown v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W. 220, 221 (Ky. 1891). 
137. State v. Thompson, 558 P.2d 202, 205 (Wash. 1977). 
138. The Court explained:  
[W]henever the government treats any person unequally because 
of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls 
squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection . . . . The application of strict 
scrutiny . . . determines whether a compelling governmental 
interest justifies the infliction of that injury. 
 
 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229–30 (1995).  
139  Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and 
Strict Scrutiny, 48 Am. J. Legal Hist. 355, 393–401 (2006). 
140. Id. at 397–401. 
141. Most of the time, anyway. Its hostility to racial classifications, when these 
could not possibly reflect biased decision making, frankly rests on policy 
objections about the bad consequences of using such classifications. See 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
746 (2007). 
142. Even Ely concedes this. Ely, supra note 73, at 147–48. 
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“heart void of social duty”143 characteristic of extreme indifference 
murder, this took DOMA outside the range of reasonable disagreement. 
To say that the tiny administrative inconvenience cited by Scalia is 
sufficient to justify the enormous burden on gay couples and their 
employers is crazy. It’s like strangling the baby because you can’t 
decide what to name it. 
V. Distracted by Federalism 
Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor would have been sounder if he had 
simply relied on Romer. But instead he felt the need to talk about 
federalism, for reasons that mystified his fellow judges.144 
He oddly fetishized state law: “The State’s decision to give this 
class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and 
status of immense import.”145 The State said, let there be dignity for 
same-sex couples. And there was dignity. Excuse me, but I thought 
that same-sex couples had a dignity and status of immense import 
whether or not the state saw fit to recognize it. Kennedy himself writes 
that the failure to recognize same-sex couples was seen as “an unjust 
exclusion,” and that this perception was “a new insight.”146 
The best sympathetic reconstruction of Kennedy’s logic is Randy 
Barnett’s analysis: it was the fact that the states had recognized same-
sex marriage that generated a protected liberty interest giving rise to 
heightened scrutiny.147 This gesture toward state law is part of a more 
general trend in Kennedy’s jurisprudence, toward trying to find some 
objective referent on which to base judgments about the contours of 
the unenumerated rights that are protected by the Constitution.148 
If Barnett is right, then state law is a constraint on the exercise of 
federal power.149 For example, it might call into question federal 
 
143. State v. Nueslein, 25 Mo. 111, 121 (1857). 
144. Chief Justice Roberts was not mystified, but used the emphasis on 
federalism to try to shield state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage from 
constitutional challenge. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2696–97 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
145  Id. at 2681 (majority opinion). 
146. Id. at 2689. 
147. Randy Barnett, Federalism Marries Liberty in the DOMA Decision, 
Scotusblog (June 26, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p
=166116.  
148. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (Kennedy, J.) 
(invalidating juvenile death penalty on the basis of evolving national 
consensus). 
149. Justice Kennedy declares that “it is unnecessary to decide whether this 
federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because 
it disrupts the federal balance.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. But if 
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marijuana prohibitions, which operate in the teeth of state efforts to 
legalize the distribution of the drug.150 It has been suggested that this 
was a way for the Court to exercise judicial modesty, by avoiding the 
charged question of whether states could confine marriage to different-
sex couples.151 But a pure Romer approach, of the kind offered here, 
would also have avoided that. As Barnett recognizes, the implications 
of Kennedy’s federalism-based approach are hardly modest. If 
Kennedy’s invocation of federalism is taken seriously, then the Court is 
back in the pre–New Deal business of policing the purposes for which 
the enumerated powers are exercised, to make sure that they do not 
interfere with matters that are reserved to the states.152 And if so, then 
a lot of other federal programs are in trouble. It was on that basis that 
the early twentieth-century Court struck down minimum wage and 
child labor laws.153 
If federal definitions of marriage must track state law, it is also 
unclear which state law they should track when these conflict. After 
Windsor, the Internal Revenue Service adopted a place-of-celebration 
rule for tax purposes, creating a class of couples whose marriages are 
recognized by federal law but not by their domiciles.154 Thus, gay 
couples in Mississippi could have their marriages recognized for federal 
purposes so long as they are willing to make a quick trip to New York 
 
Barnett is right, then this is a distinction without a difference: Kennedy’s 
liberty-focused analysis is parasitic on federalism concerns. 
150. Randy Barnett, Federalism Marries Liberty in the DOMA Decision, 
Volokh Conspiracy (June 26, 2013, 4:52 PM), http://www.volokh.com
/2013/06/26/federalism-marries-liberty-in-the-doma-decision/.  
151. Rick Pildes, Why Justice Kennedy’s DOMA Opinion Has the Unique 
Legal Structure It Has, Balkinization (June 26, 2013, 1:34 PM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/why-justice-kennedys-doma-opinion
-has.html. 
152. See Andrew Koppelman, The Tough Luck Constitution and the 
Assault on Health Care Reform 52–56 (2013). This is, of course, a 
result that Barnett would welcome. See id. at 80–90. On the other hand, 
Barnett is admirably immune from the state worship that possesses 
Justice Kennedy. 
153. Linda Greenhouse noted the dangers in the federalism argument before 
Justice Kennedy adopted it. Trojan Horse, N.Y. Times Opinionator 
(Apr. 3, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/ 
03/trojan-horse/. 
154. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. A bill under congressional 
consideration would create the same rule throughout the United States 
Code. Respect for Marriage Act, S. 1236, 113th Cong. (2013). A similar 
rule is implied, perhaps inadvertently, by this sentence in Kennedy’s 
opinion: “DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State 
[Kennedy does not say which!] entitled to recognition and protection to 
enhance their own liberty. . . . This opinion and its holding are confined 
to those lawful marriages.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96. 
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to marry. Fortunately, the Court did not endorse arguments that would 
have called this legislation into doubt. 
Conclusion 
The Court thus appropriately concluded that DOMA was 
unconstitutional: “The Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the 
very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.”155  
The rule implied in the bare desire to harm cases is one with fuzzy 
boundaries, and there is plenty of room for disagreement about where 
it does and does not apply. It lacks the mechanical clarity of the levels-
of-scrutiny approach, which simply asks what kind of classification is 
being made. That is why Romer has had little effect in the lower courts, 
some of which have simply noted that the Court did not speak of strict 
scrutiny and applied the most deferential possible analysis to laws 
discriminating against gay people.156 Windsor leaves an even thicker fog 
by combining the Romer analysis with an invocation of federalism and 
mixing the two analyses incoherently. Justice Scalia correctly observes 
that the lower courts will probably find Windsor easy to distinguish 
from any case that comes before them in the future.157 As in Romer, 
the Court finds an equal protection violation, but its holding is unlikely 
to have much effect. 
Still, as a matter of pure equal protection theory, these laws were 
unconstitutional and the Court was right to get rid of them. Larger 
questions were postponed for another day.158 But the equal protection 
holding of Windsor is sound. 
 
155. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
156. Kate Girard, The Irrational Legacy of Romer v. Evans: A Decade of 
Judicial Review Reveals the Need for Heightened Scrutiny of Legislation 
That Denies Equal Protection to Members of the Gay Community, 36 
N.M. L. Rev. 565, 574 (2006); William C. Duncan, The Legacy of Romer 
v. Evans—So Far, 10 WIDENER J. Pub. L. 161 (2001). 
157. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
158. Justice Sotomayor probably spoke for many of the Justices when she 
asked: “If the issue is letting the States experiment and letting the society 
have more time to figure out its direction, why is taking a case now the 
answer?” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 64. 
